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THE CALLING OF THE CONVENTION
The three principal economic factors which led to the calling of the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 are usually said to be the desire to put
the central government on a sound financial basis, the need for national
commercial regulations, especially against England and the conflicting
state interests, and the necessity of protecting property rights from the
attacks of the debtor classes.
The first of these points was in a sense connected with the third,
since the establishment of government credit meant incidentally pro-
tection for holders of government securities. There was, as Patrick
Henry said in the Virginia Convention, not only a struggle for empire,
but also a struggle for money.' Professor Beard estimates that at least
five-sixths of the members of the Federal Convention were government
security holders. 2 This does not necessarily imply that the constitutional
fathers were a gang of grafters, even though Hamilton's financial policy
later gave real substance to the public securities, which according to
James Wilson were melting "in the hands of the holders like snow
before the sun."3 Although naturally influenced by the interest of their
particular class, they were probably for the most part, as Robert Morris
said, plain honest men.
Government finance was even more closely tied-up with the regula-
tion of commerce, since government credit depended upon commercial
prosperity and could be used to promote commercial prosperity. Com-
merce and finance, in fact, were usually mentioned together. Commerce
at that time, it must be remembered, comprised practically "all activities
* Assistant Professor of History, Marquette University, Ph.D., Wis. 1938.
' Debates in the Several State Convention on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution, ed. by Jonathan Elliot (Washington, 1836), III, 475 (hereafter
cited as Debates).
2 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States (New York, 1929), 149 (hereafter cited as Beard).3 Debates, II, 431.
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directly affecting the wealth of the nation," including the development
of manufactures, of agriculture and of the West.
It is possible, then, to reduce the economic factors behind the Con-
stitutional Convention to two: the need for the regulation of commerce
and the need for the protection of property rights. Which of these
factors was dominant? Was the convention called to meet at Philadel-
phia primarily to promote the economic welfare of the nation or to
protect vested creditor interests?
There is some evidence to support the latter view. Both Washington
and Madison, for instance, made rather strong statements at the opening
of the Federal Convention. The Washington statement is indirect and
consequently less important than the other. It will be considered first.
Writing to Jefferson toward the end of May, 1787, Washington said
that the government was "shaken of its foundation" and that unless a
remedy was soon found "anarchy and confusion" would inevitably
follow.5 One almost immediately associates the idea of anarchy with
Shays' Rebellion. But was this necessarily Washington's meaning?
More than a year before he had declared the country was in a "delicate
situation." He could not have been referring to Shays' Rebellion here;
or even to other threats to property, for a few months later lie said
that the internal governments were daily acquiring strength and that
justice was well administered.6
In view of the strong impression which Shays' Rebellion made on
him, it is possible that his Jefferson letter did refer to that incident.
It is more likely, though, that it referred rather to the whole impossible
economic and political situation of the country. He seems to have lost
interest in the Massachusetts insurrection after the close of February,
1787. His correspondence is proof of this. Moreover, when first elected
to the Constitutional Convention he declined, on the ground that he had
previously asked to be excused from attending a Cincinnati Convention,
which was scheduled for the same time and place as the Federal Con-
vention. It was not until assured by Knox that his attendance would
make him doubly the Father of his Country that he finally came around.7
If the threat to property rights had been still critical, it is probable that
a man of Washington's character would have taken a much bolder stand.
The Madison statement is much more pointed. In the early days of
the Philadelphia meeting, he said that interference with private rights
4 Walton H. Hamilton and Douglass Adair, The Power to Govern: The Con-
stitution-Then and Now (New York, 1937), 63 (hereafter cited as Hamilton
and Adair).
5 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, ed. by Max Farrant (New Haven,
1911), III, 31 (hereafter cited as Records of the Federal Convention).
6 The Writings of George Washington, ed. by Worthington C. Ford (New York,
1893), XI, 131-132 (hereafter cited as Writings of Washington).
7 Ibid. XI, 121-23, 128-30.
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"had perhaps more than anything else produced this Convention."8 No
doubt this represented Madison's real view, since numerous letters of
his, although not so direct, are of the same general character. It must be
noted, however, that his statement is qualified by the word "perhaps."
Nor is it entirely consistent with his earlier correspondence and
conduct. He had staged a fight against paper money in Virginia. But
his letters written at the time of Shays' Rebellion betrayed much more
agitation over the proposed surrender of the Mississippi than over the
situation in Massachusetts. When he learned that his friend Henry Lee
favored the Mississippi project, he ran against Lee in the next Con-
gressional election and defeated him.
In August of 1785 he was worried about Great Britain's "machina-
tions" and the antifederal expedients which might result. If the defects
of the Confederation were not remedied, he was fearful of its complete
destruction."0 "In fact," he wrote Jefferson in the spring of 1786, "most
of our political evils may be traced up to our commercial ones, as most
of our moral may to our political.""
Madison was by no means the only one to comment on the critical
situation of the Confederation in the period before Shays' Rebellion.
The idea seems to have been commonly accepted. Only a few opinions
can be cited here,
In an address to Governor Bowdoin, in July, 1785, the selectmen of
Newburyport said: "The critical state of our commerce and the weight
of the public debt that presses us demand the strictest attention to every
commercial and economical situation.' 12
Early in 1786 a Congressional committee reported that the people
must make up their minds to give the government adequate financial
support or hazard the very existence of the union."s Henry Lee, serving
in Congress at the time, wrote that the death of the federal government
could not be far distant unless the states immediately exerted themselves
and paid their quotas.14
Just a year before he crushed Shays' forces at Petersham, Lincoln
wrote Rufus King a rather interesting letter. According to Lincoln it
was Massachusetts' interest to be the carriers of her neighbors' produce
8 Records of the Federal Convention, I, 134.
9 Thomas A. Boyd, Light Horse Harry Lee (New York, 1931). 157.10 The Writings of James Madison, ed. by Gaillard Hunt (New York, 1910),
II, 158 (hereafter cited as Writings of Madison).
11 Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution (Boston, 1928), 16 (hereafter
cited as Warren, Making of the Constitution).12 "The Bowdoin and Temple Papers" in Collections of the Mass. Hist. Soc.,
Seventh Series, VI (1907), 56 (hereafter cited as Collections of the Mass.
Hist. Soc.).
"3Journals of Congress: Containing Their Proceedings from November 6, 1786
to November 5, 1787 (Philadelphia, 1801.), IV, 620.
14 Correspondence of the American Revolution, being Letters of Eminent Men to
George Washington, ed. by Jared Sparks (Boston, 1853), IV, 126.
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as well as her own; only in this way could she secure means of remit-
tance for her purchases; Massachusetts would for this reason favor
Congressional regulation of trade. The failure of this and the aversion,
in some states, to settle the debts of the United States would, in the
opinion of many, cause the foundations of the Confederation to be
undermined. 15
In June, 1786, Governor Bowdoin was ready to agree with Gorham
that unless the states met their requisitions the federal government
would cease to exist.16
During the early part of 1786 there seems to have been more alarm
over federal finance than anything else. This shows that government
security holdings were low because of the commercial depression, before
the attack on property rights became much of a factor. 7 The demand
for financial reform meant, consequently, a scheme of promoting
securities rather than a means of warding off an attack on property
rights. And such promotion was closely tied up with commercial pro-
motion, since commerce and finance were mutually helpful.
Nor must it be forgotten that the Philadelphia Convention grew out
of two conventions having to do with commerce. The second of these,
the Annapolis Convention, was intended as a stepping stone in the
direction of a thorough-going revision of the Articles-and this before
Shays' Rebellion became acute."'
John Dickinson summed up the situation back as far as 1783. He
thought that further power ought to be given to Congress to regulate
and protect commerce, to raise revenues by import duties, and to
terminate dissensions within the states. Of these three the first was the
one which many persons were "most earnest to have lodged in Congress
without control."' 9
It has been said that the attack on property rights, especially Shays'
Rebellion, gave the final impetus to the movement for the Constitutional
Convention by winning over the hesitant New England States. There
is some evidence in support of this contention.
About the time when the Shaysites were first becoming really
formidable, Stephen Higginson of Massachusetts wrote General Knox
that he never saw so great a change of attitude in his state as to the
necessity, for increasing Congress's power, not only in regard to com-
15 The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, ed. by Charles R. King (New
York, 1894), I, 156-60 (hereafter cited as Correspondence of Rufus King).
16 Collections of the Mass. Hist. Soc., Seventh Series, VI, 104, Bowdoin Papers.
17 Government securities were acutally lower in July, 1786, than during the fall
of the same year. See Pa. Packet, July 31, Aug. 5, Aug. 17, Aug. 19, Sept. 1,
October 4 and Dec. 22, 1786.
18 Warren, Making of the Constitution, 22-23.
19 "Thomson Papers" in Collections of the N.Y. Hist. Soc., Third Series, XI(1878), 71.
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merce but generally.20 Two months later Humphreys sent Washington
a somewhat similar message. He said that King, Sedgwick and several
other gentlemen who had been mortally opposed to the Cincinnati, were
now looking to that quarter for political protection.2 1
The actual facts are somewhat at variance with these statements. If
Shays' Rebellion was as influential as supposed, it is difficult to explain
why the New England States delayed so long their approval of the
Federal Convention. Massachusetts reached her decision on February
22,1787; Connecticut chose no delegates until May; New Hampshire
waited until June for her election. Rhode Island, of course, sent no
delegates at all.22
Rufus King may have turned to the Cincinnati for protection as
early as January 20, 1787, as Humphreys thought. But so far as his
correspondence shows he did not begin to regard the Constitutional
Convention with favor until more than a week after the battle of
Petersham. Even then he was not too sure of its legality.2 3
By this time, Higginson was ready to admit that he was wrong about
Massachusetts' conversion to federalism. He told Knox that the state
had been favorable to the convention the previous year, but that the
sentiments expressed by King and Dane before the legislature had made
a great change in the minds of the members. Higginson was here
referring to the fact that, when Annapolis report was before Congress
in the fall of 1786, both King and Dane appeared before the Massa-
chusetts legislature in an effort to convince it that Congress was the
proper body to propose amendments to the Articles. 2
Higginson was undoubtedly right about Massachusetts' being origi-
nally in favor of the convention. In fact, the legislature itself had in
1785 proposed the calling of a convention to amend the Articles of
Confederation, but the Massachusetts delegates-Gerry, Holten and
King-had failed to report it to Congress. In explanation of their action
the delegates pointed out to Bowdoin that it would suffice to give
Congress the power to regulate trade for fifteen years. Anything more
than this would be dangerous, since it would be impossible to change, if
experience proved that they had gone in the wrong direction. The
convention method was illegal, according to the report, and might lead
to a complete revision of the Articles. Finally, there was fear of
20 Warren, Making of the Constitution, 32-33, note.
21 Frank L. Humphreys, Life and Times of David Humphreys (Neew York, 1917),
1, 393-98.
22 George Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United
States of America (second edition, New York, 1882), 275-76.23 Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress, ed. by Edmund C. Burnett
(Washington, 1936), VIII, 392 (hereafter cited as Burnett).
24 Ibid., VIII, 38-39.
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aristocratic government; the Cincinnati already tended in that
direction.25
When Massachusetts turned back again toward federalism in
February, 1787, the explanation given by William Irvine to James
Wilson was that the New England delegates were still really antifederal
but voted for the Convention in Congress because they saw it would
succeed without them.26 Since seven states were already favorable to
the Convention,27 Irvine may have been right. Another possible ex-
planation is that Massachusetts was converted because King and Dane
were converted. It was they who drew up the resolution adopted by
Congress calling for the Philadelphia Convention.
The motives which actuated these two men are somewhat problem-
atical. But the evidence seems to indicate that both were inspired by
interest in federal finance and western lands.
King was one of those who took the financial crisis of 1786 quite
seriously. Unlike most of the others he stressed its effect upon his own
personal affairs. In April of 1786 he told Gerry that he had not received
his salary. "I can support myself," he went on, "and freely would do it,
if I can serve my country. But if a dissolution must come ... it behoves
every one to withdraw in season to effect, if possible, some sort of
personal security."28 King, it is interesting to note, was a holder of
government securities. 29
A little more than a month later we find him writing to Gerry again
-this time on the Mississippi question. The interests of the people west
of the mountains were so different from those of the east, he believed,
that if the Mississippi was immediately opened to commerce they would
separate from the union. In this case, the United States would get no
money for the domestic debt. On the other hand the Spanish treaty
would encourage foreign trade, tie the East and West together by
internal commerce, and by reducing the price of land, would lead to
settlement.30
In April, 1787, King opposed an attempt of Madison to secure the
adoption of a resolution by Congress to the effect that a vote of seven
states did not authorize a suspension of the use of the Mississippi. He
was able to prevent Madison's resolution from coming to a vote.31
About the time that King was making up his mind that perhaps the
convention idea was not so bad after all, the leaders of the Ohio
Company were advertising a meeting to be held in Boston. At the meet-
25 Correspondence of Rufus King, I, 60-66.
28 Burnett, 40.
27 Writings of Madison, II, 311.
28 Correspondence of Rufus King, I, 133-35
29 Beard, 125.
30 Correspondence of Ruf!is King, I, 175 79.
31 Debates, V, 103-104.
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ing, March 8, 1787, 250 shares of stock were subscribed at a thousand
dollars a share. A share could be purchased for ten dollars in cash or
for a thousand dollars in government securities. It was found that
many people of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New
Hampshire were interested in taking stock but held back because of the
uncertainty of securing a large enough tract of ground for a great
settlement. For that reason Samuel H. Parsons, Rufus Putnam and the
Reverend Manasseh Cutler were chosen directors to apply to Congress
for a private purchase of land.32
Cutler seems to have been the moving spirit in the enterprise. One
of the first men to whom he wrote was Nathan Dane, colleague of
Rufus King. In a letter to Dane, March 16, 1787, Cutler expressed a
hope that, notwithstanding the land ordinance, Congress would make
a private sale to the Ohio Company at fifty cents an acre-a price at
which many of the states sold land. He admitted that the federal land
was better, but thought that the danger of Indian wars was a factor
in determining the price.33
By personal contacts with members of Congress and the members
of the Constitutional Convention and by making use of the instrumen-
tality of Dane, Cutler was able to'get his deal through Congress in July,
although the price was somewhat higher than he anticipated. The
following month Edward Carrington of Virginia wrote Monroe that
they had at last made a break into the western lands. "This Company,"
he told Monroe, "is formed of the best men in Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts."3'
A year later the Massachusetts delegates, Dane and Otis, con-
gratulated themselves that the lands owned by Congress might be used
as a sure means of sinking a large part of the domestic debt of the
United States. They pointed out that about nine million acres were
already disposed of and that applications for the purchase of three
million more had been made.35
No attempt has here been made to treat adequately the influence of
the western land question on the making of the Constitution. That
would require a separate study. The author has merely tried to show
that federal finance and western lands were a factor in winning New
England support for the Constitutional Convention. Even for this
purpose the evidence presented is not conclusive. But the author feels
that it offers a better explanation for the changing attitude of New
England than Shays' Rebellion. It is not contended that the latter was
W2. P. Cutler and J. P. Cutler, Life and Journals and Correspondence of Rev.
Manasseh Cutler (Cincinnati, 1888), I, 191.33 Ibid., I, 194-5.
84 Burnett, VIII, 631.35 Ibid., VIII, 739.
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not of some influence. But it is the author's opinion that commerce,
taken as including federal finance and western development, was the
principal force behind the Federal Convention.
COMMERCE IN THE CONVENTION
So much has already been written about the commerce power of
Congress that a complete treatment of the subject in these pages is
hardly necessary. Yet there are certain phases of the subject which
must be considered here-some in general terms, others in more detail.
The members of the Convention almost unanimously agreed, as will
be shown later, on the necessity of protecting private property. But at
the opening of the Convention they were even more unanimously of the
opinion that commerce ought to be regulated. All three plans of
government introduced provided for commercial regulation. Only the
Virginia plan provided for protection of property rights. Madison
criticized the Paterson plan for this very reason. When Sherman
enumerated the various powers which Congress ought to have, including
among them commercial regulation, Madison again raised the objection
that Sherman had failed to mention the protection of property rights.36
These facts prove Madison's attachment to private rights, but they
indicate at the same time that other members were also interested in
something else.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Convention compressed the power of Congress over commerce
into a single clause: "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." But they meant
by this clause most of what it means today and in one respect more.
The courts have actually limited the commerce power on the theory
of states' rights, whereas the founding fathers meant for the national
government to be absolutely sovereign in the field of foreign and
interstate commerce.87
In his introductory speech at the opening of the Convention,
Randolph declared that among the powers Congress should have was
the "counteracting of the commercial regulations of other nations and
the pushing of commerce ad libitum." The latter included the "estab-
lishment of great national works-the improvement of inland naviga-
tion-agriculture--manufactures-a freer intercourse among the
citizens. '38
Randolph's view was the one commonly held. Gouverneur Morris,
Madison and Fitzsimmons believed that Congress should have the right
.16 Records of Fed. Cony., I, 3 and 7 ff.
17 Edward S. Corwin, The Commerce Power versus States Rights (Princeton,
1936), 4-5.
- Hamilton and Adair, 112-13.
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to tax exports to encourage manufactures. Morris looked into the
future and saw the arrival of a time when manufactures would require
raw materials. Madison thought the delegates ought to be governed by
national and permanent views.39
Nor did the delegates stop at the promotion of manufactures.
Charles Pinckney wanted Coligress to promote agriculture, commerce,
trades and manufactures. Gouverneur Morris proposed the establish-
ment of a department of domestic affairs to supervise agriculture,
manufactures, the development of roads and navigation, and the
encouragement of interstate commerce. 40
Madison even favored the granting of charters to corporations.
His proposition was voted down. But Wilson insisted that the power
was implied in the commerce clause in any case. George Mason thought
Wilson was wrong. When, however, he drew up his list of objections
to the Constitution, the right to grant monopolies was among them.41
The constitutional fathers thus gave to the commerce power a much
more liberal interpretation than the Supreme Court in recent times has
been wont to do. It was not merely negative in internal affairs, as has
sometimes been said, but positive as well. It looked to the future as
well as to the present. It was reduced to a single clause in the interest
of simplicity, not to limit the :ower of Congress.
THE CompRoMIsE
Of the three compromises made during the course of the Conven-
tion's work, the one in regard to counting three-fifths of the slaves both
for taxation and representation, was meant to protect a peculiar species
of property. The other two had to do with commerce.
Almost to the close of the Convention, a two-thirds vote was neces-
sary to regulate commerce. This was to prevent the northern states
from monopolizing the trade of the South as England had done. The
small states without commercial centers wanted majority control of
trade to protect them from their powerful neighbors. When a proposal
was made to tax or to prohibit the importation of slaves, South Carolina
and Georgia combined with the small states to effect a compromise.
The agreement was that Congress might regulate commerce by a simple
majority vote, but the import tax on slaves was not to exceed ten dollars
a head and importation was not to be prohibited before 1808. Later as
a concession to Southern interests a prohibition against taxing exports
was added.42








small states, which resulted in proportionate representation in the House
and equal representation in'the Senate. This was the Great Compromise
-- great in the sense that three weeks of discussion were required to
arrive at a decision which prevented an actual break-up of the
Convention. Oddly enough few writers have ever stressed the economic
factors in the background. 43
COMMERCE AND THE GREAT COMPROMISE
It has been customary, rather, to picture the struggle leading up to
the Compromise as a contest between little men of narrow views and big
men of broad national outlook. It is possibly true that the small-state
men did not measure up to the large-state delegates in statesmanship,
although Paterson and Dickinson were possessed of more than average
ability. On the other hand, Professor Beard has shown that they were
of approximately the same social standing as the large-state men, and
that, with the possible exception of the New York and Delaware
representatives, they had the same economic motives for wanting a
strong national government as did the other members of the Con-
vention. 44
As to the claim that the small states were naturally more in favor
of states' rights, both common sense and considerable opinion in the
Convention point to the fact that they really had greater reason to
support a national government precisely because they were small states.
It is interesting to note in this connection that New Jersey and Mary-
land were the last two states to ratify the Articles of Confederation, and
the reason was that that instrument did not give Congress sufficient
power. Both states insisted that the national government have juris-
diction over the western lands, and New Jersey favored making regu-
lation of trade a Congressional prerogative.45 These two little states
may be accused of selfishness possibly, but hardly of standing for a
states' rights' view. It is worthy to note also that when the northern
states voted to give Jay the right to surrender the navigation of the
Mississippi for a period of years, New Jersey refused to support them.
According to Madison, New Jersey feared that the surrender of the
river would mean increased taxes to the central government."
The contest in the Convention showed similar economic forces at
work, although they were not always apparent. On May 30, in com-
mittee of the whole, a motion was passed to the effect "that a national
government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislaitive,
executive and judiciary." Delaware voted with the large states in favor
4 3 Max Farrant, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (New
York, 1913), 94-95 (hereafter cited as Farrand).4 4 Beard, 170.
45 The Records of the Federal Convention, Farrant, I, 250.
46 Debates, III, 346.
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of this proposition, Connecticut was opposed, New York divided, and
New Jersey and Maryland not yet represented.47 During the next two
weeks a large part of the Virginia plan was adopted in committee of
the whole with only moderate opposition. The real struggle started
when motions were passed for proportionate representation in both
houses. The second of the two propositions, providing for proportionate
representation in Senate, was carried by a vote of six to five, with Con-
necticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland in oppo-
sition.48 Four days later Paterson introduced the New Jersey plan,
which he said was "purely federal" in its principles.49
The real economic motives behind the small-state men had been
hinted at vaguely by Franklin, who said:
"The greater states, Sir, are naturally as unwilling to have
their property left in the disposition of the smaller states as the
smaller are to have theirs in the disposition of the greater."' °
These motives were to become clearer later.
Meanwhile the Convention-or at least some of its members-let
itself be deceived into thinking that there was question of adopting a
national government or of revising the Articles. As a matter of fact
both plans were largely national. Madison, comparing the two, said:
"One characteristic was that in a federal government the
power was exercised not on the people individually, but on the
people collectively as states. Yet in some instances as in piracies,
captures, etc., the existing confederacy, and in many instances,
the amendments proposed to it by Mr. Paterson must operate on
individuals."51
Perhaps the main difference between the two plans after all was that
one provided for a legal if impossible method of ratification, while the
other was revolutionary in this respect. An examination of the two
plans does not reveal such great differences as are generally imagined
to exist.
In the first place, both plans provided for three distinct departments
of government. There was to be only a one-house Congress under the
New Jersey plan, but most national states today have one-house
parliaments in actual practice. Equal representation in the New Jersey
plan was unfair, but not necessarily opposed to the idea of national
government. Both plans provided for an executive to be elected by
Congress,5 2 which would have meant something like the English cabinet
system.
47 Farrant, 73.4 8 Records of Federal Convention of 1787, I, 202.49 Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, (New York,
1905), 212.5 0 Records of Federal Convention of 1787, I, 196.
51 Ibid., I, 314.52 Farrant, 225-32.
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As far as the judiciary was concerned, the Virginia plan was some-
what more national because it provided for a system of national courts,
while the New Jersey plan would have set up only a supreme court.
The latter plan, however, practically made federal courts of the state
courts by providing that the national laws and treaties were the supreme
law of the states, enforceable in the state courts even though contrary
to their own state constitutions.53 The judicial system as finally adopted
was not necessarily so different from this. In the Virginia Convention
there was serious talk of Congress' conferring federal jurisdiction on
the state courts instead of creating inferior courts. Patrick Henry
expressed himself as being much disturbed at such a proposal because
of its tendency to destroy the effectiveness of the state courts as
guardians of states' rights. 4
In providing for coercion the New Jersey plan was really more
national in a way than the other, since it authorized calling forth the
militia against individuals as well as against states. The Virginia plan
originally provided only for the coercion of states. 55
The Congress in the large state scheme was to have the legislative
powers enjoyed under the Articles and the right "to legislate in all cases
to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony
of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
legislation." This, of course, went much beyond the New Jersey plan,
but it is significant that the latter added the only two powers really
lacking under the Articles-the power to raise revenue and the power
to regulate commerce.56 Hence it was probably closer in this respect to
our present Constitution than the Virginia plan. Paterson's scheme
retained the partial use of requisitions, but the Revolution was fought-
theoretically at least-for the requisition system. Both Mason of
Virginia and Smith of New York in their opposition to the Constitution
held that it was impossible for the people to be adequately represented
in Congress and hence that it ought not to have the right to levy direct
taxes.
57
The only important difference between the two plans, aside from
the method of ratification, was the question of equal or proportionate
representation. This was realized fairly well in the Convention. Madison
said that "the great difficulty lies in the affair of representation; and
if this could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable."58 Sherman





57Debates, II and III.
8 Records of Federal Conveirtion of 1787, 1, 321.
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"You see the consequences of pushing things too far. Some
of the members from the small states wish for two branches in
the general legislature, and are friends to a good national
government; but we would sooner submit to a foreign power
than submit to be deprived of an equality in both branches of the
legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination of the
large states." 59
Pinckney was of the opinion that "the whole comes to this. Give New
Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in
the national system."60
The small states' spokesmen voiced the economic fears behind their
desire for equality vigorously if not always clearly. "Is there no
difference of interests," asked Bedford, "no rivalry of commerce, of
manufactures? Will not the large states crush the small ones whenever
they stand in the way of their acquisitions? ' '61 More to the point,
perhaps, was this question of Ellsworth:
"Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or
arrangement, three or four free ports and no more were to be
established, would not combinations be formed in favor of
Boston, Philadelphia, and some port on Chesapeake ?' '62
In reply Hamilton said that "the only considerable distinction of
interests lay between the carrying and non-carrying states, which divide
instead of unite the largest states." But both Franklin and Madison
admitted that there was probably something to the claim of the small
states.63 Charles Pinckney went further. He said that the large states
might secure a preference in appointments and "that they might also
find some common points in their commercial interest favorable to
them."64
To what extent the small states were justified in their fears it is of
course impossible to say. This much, however, is clear: that the small
states outside of New York and Maryland-and of course Rhode
Island, which was not a factor in the Convention-were for the most
part both non-importing and non-carrying states. Madison testified
that the non-carrying states included not only the Southern states, but
New, Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut, and a great part of New Hamp-
shire.6 5 Hamilton said that Connecticut and New Jersey were the least
maritime of all the states, but that they might develop a carrying trade
if imposts should prove inconvenient. 66 Ellswortl claimed that New
- Note, Writings of Madison, III, 166.
60 Ibid., III, 179.
61 Records of Federal Convention of 1787, I, 165.
,;2 Ibd., I, 482.
63 Records of Federal Convention of 1787, I, 486, 488.
64 Ibid., 492-93.
,
5 Debates, III, 312.
,-6 The Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. by Henry Cabot Lodge (New York,
1904). 1, 276.
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York raised by impost between sixty and eighty thousand pounds
sterling, of which Connecticut paid a third, and if she transferred the
business to Massachusetts she would have a similar bill to pay.6
7
Nor was there question of imports only. According to Madison,
Virginia exported the produce of North Carolina; Pennsylvania that of
New Jersey and Delaware; and Rhode Island that of Connecticut and
Massachusetts.68 It is significant that New Hampshire, New Jersey and
Delaware voted to tax exports in order to give Congress control over
them.69
Another question, which influenced Maryland at least, was the
establishment of favored ports. Martin testified that his delegation had
secured the clause to the effect that no preference should be given to
the ports of one state over those of another in order to prevent
Norfolk's being made a favorite port at the expense of Maryland.
7 0
Whether or not the commercial fears of the small states were well
founded, they evidently considered equality in the Senate sufficient
protection. This gained, they ceased their opposition both in the National
Convention and in the state conventions. Delaware, New Jersey and
Georgia-which shifted to the small state column when it came to a
showdown-ratified unanimously. There was little opposition in Con-
necticut or even in Maryland and New Hampshire. New York and
Rhode Island were the only so-called small states to put up a fight
against ratification. All of this shows pretty clearly that they had never
opposed the Constitution. The real reason for their support of the
New Jersey plan was the desire for economic independence from their
stronger neighbors. The Great Compromise guaranteed them this.
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE CONVENTION
Although the Constitution was not made primarily for the protection
of property rights, it is undoubtedly true that property rights played a
large part in the construction of the machinery of the federal govern-
ment. Partly for this reason and partly because, to the author's
knowledge, no systematic study has ever been made on the subject, it
will be considered here in some detail.
It is easy to exaggerate the influence of property rights even in the
case of governmental machinery. The various departments were often
formed to promote commerce almost as much as for the other purpose.
Besides, we must remember the theory followed was that the govern-
ment should be organized on the check and balance system, to represent
all classes.
67 Debates, II, 189.
68 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 111, 328.
69 Ibid., II, 362.
70 Ibid., III, 452.
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The aristocratic Hamilton perhaps best gave expression to this
theory. There was, he said, in every community a division into the few
and the many. If all the power was given to the many, they would
oppress the few. A transfer of the power would lead to oppression in
the opposite direction. "Both therefore ought to have power that each
may defend itself against the other. To the want of this check we owe
our paper money-installment laws, etc."71
Hamilton's last sentence struck the keynote for the Convention's
work. Government representing all might be the theory. Checks on too
much democracy was to be the practice. Some concessions were made
to the theory, though. This was especially true in providing for the
House of Representatives.
THE HousE
The Randolph resolutions, or Virginia plan, provided for a lower
house to be elected by the people. This subject came up for considera-
tion in the committee of the whole on May 31. Gerry and Sherman
immediately rose in opposition to election by the people. Mason,
Wilson, and Randolph, however, were favorable. Wilson favored a
high pyramid with a broad base, to secure the confidence of the people.
He said that opposition to federal measures proceeded from state office-
holders rather than from the people.72
The Randolph proposition was temporarily adopted, with only New
Jersey and South Carolina voting in the negative. A week later Charles
Pinckney moved to substitute election by the state legislature on the
ground that the people were poor judges of such matters. Gerry and
Sherman supported Pinckney. Gerry opposed too much democracy.
George Mason took the opposite view. The legislatures had issued
paper money he said, not the people. 73
Despite the arguments of Pinckney and Gerry, the popular idea
carried the day and Pinckney's motion was voted down with only three
states dissenting. Even Hamilton took a democratic stand on this issue.
He declared himself to be a friend of vigorous government, but he held,
at. the same time, that the popular branch should be on a broad foun-
dation. Otherwise the people would be warranted in being jealous of
their liberties.74
This, though, is not the.whole story. The decision had been made
for popular election; the question who were the people for purposes of
election remained to be settled. The Randolph resolutions indicated
71 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, I, 18.
72 Ibid., I, 20, 48.
73 Ibid., I, 48, 132.
74 Ibd., I, 132; II, 553.
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that the voters should have certain qualifications but laid down no
specific requirement.75
Toward the end of July this problem was turned over to the Com-
mittee of Detail for solution. James Wilson as Committee Chairman
made three different attempts to find a solution. His first plan provided
that House electors were to be freemen twenty-one years old and
owning freehold estates of fifty acres. The second plan stated that the
state legislatures might prescribe the qualifications of the electors, with
the United States reserving the right to alter or suspend such qualifica-
tions at any time. The third plan required the electors to have the same
qualifications as the electors of the more numerous branch of the state
legislatures."
When Wilson's third plan was reported to the Convention on
August 7, quite a discussion arose. Gouverneur Morris moved to
substitute some plan that would reserve the right of suffrage to the
freeholders. The motion was seconded by Fitzsimmons of Pennsyl-
vania. Wilson in defense said that the report was well considered-that
it was difficult to formulate any uniform rule for all of the states.
Moreover, he added it would be disagreeable for a person to vote for
the state legislature and be excluded from voting for the national
legislature.t 7
Mason supported Wilson very ably. He pointed out that several
states had extended the franchise beyond the freeholders and that the
people would object to disfranchisement. Later in the course of the
debate he added that "Every man having evidence of attachment to
and permanent common interest with society ought to share in all its
rights and privileges." He doubted whether property was the only
mark of permanent attachment.7 8
Franklin came out against all qualifications. The common people
were the ones to be trusted in his view. Ellsworth thought that the
tax-payers should have the vote. Gorham believed that the elections in
Philadelphia, New York and Boston, where the mechanics could vote,
were at least as good as those conducted by freeholders only.79
Perhaps more speakers backed Morris. Dickinson held that the
restriction of the suffrage to the freeholders was "a necessary defense
against the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property
and without principle, with which our country like all others, will in
time abound." Viewing the matter abstractly, Madison thought that
75 Ibid., I, 20.
76 Ibid.. I, 151, 153, 163.
77 Ibid., II, 201.
78 Ibid., II, 212, 203.
" Ibid.. II, 202, 205, 215.
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Dickinson was perfectly right. However, he was willing to accept the
Wilson report as a practical solution.80
The Morris motion was voted down and the next day the Wilson
report was unanimously approved.8' It has been repeatedly said by
historians that the Convention's decision was influenced by the fact
that all of the states had voting qualifications. This inference seems
logical enough. But there is no direct evidence in the debates to support
it. The need for some practical solution and the fear of antagonizing
the people seem to have been the decisive points.
The Committee of Detail also reported a provision to the effect that
the national legislature should establish property qualifications for its
own members. Charles Pinckney undertook to criticize this provision.
He said if he were to fix the amount of property which office-holders
should have, he should not consider less than a hundred thousand
dollars for the President, half of that for each of the judges and a
proportionate sum for the members of the national legislature. He
moved that each of these office-holders should be required to swear
that they had unencumbered estates. The motion was seconded by
Rutledge, who explained that the committee had been unable to agree
on qualifications and wanted to avoid displeasing the people.8 2
There was not much of a debate in this case. Franklin again came
out against all qualifications. Madison thought that if there were to be
qualifications at all they should be fixed in the Constitution. Otherwise
the national legislature might gradually subvert the Constitution.
Wilson finally came to the conclusion that it was better to drop the
committee's clause altogether for the reason that it would constructively
deprive the national legislature of the right of making all other
regulatory qualifications.8 3
Wilson's suggestion was followed and the committee's provision
was rejected. On the basis of Wilson's opinion this action might be
interpreted as expressing the desire of the Convention to give Congress
implied power to lay down property qualifications of its own. It is
doubtful, though, whether many members were so federalist in their
views. As a matter of fact, Pinckney's motion was at the same time
rejected by so decisive a vote that no roll was called.8 4 This would
indicate that, in the mind of the Convention, Congress was not to
represent creditors only.
The term of the members of the House remains to be dealt with.
The subject was first taken up in the committee of the whole on June 13.
Terms of one, two and three years were considered, the latter being
so Ibid., II, 202 and 203.
'x Ibid., II, 205 and 215.
-12 Ibid., II, 248.
"1 Ibid., II, 249 and 251.
14 Ibid., II, 250 and 251.
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adopted with four states in opposition. In the Convention itself, nine
days later, two years was substituted for three. Ellsworth even favored
one year. He thought that the people might be humored here. Hamilton,
on the other hand, favored a three-year term as a check on democracy. 8
The evidence shows that many of the delegates were against making
even the House too democratic. However, the guiding principle here
seems to have been to organize a body which would appeal to the people
rather than an agency for the protection of property rights.
TiE SENATE
It must be recalled that before the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, United States Senators were elected by the state legis-
lature for six years, one-third of them going out of office each year.88
In the Convention, election by the legislatures was considered separately,
while the six-year term and continuity of membership were discussed
together.
The original Virginia plan provided for the nomination of senatorial
candidates by the state legislatures and election by the House of Repre-
sentatives. In introducing this provision on May 31, Randolph said
that:
"the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under
which the United States laboured; that in tracing these evils to
their origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies
of democracy; that some check therefore was to be sought
against this tendency of our governments: and that a good
Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose."8 7
Spaight immediately moved for election of the Senate by the state
legislatures. The motion, however, was withdrawn when King pointed
out that it would destroy proportionate representation. Pinckney then
proposed to strike out nomination by the legislature from the Virginia
provision, which would have made the Senate entirely elective by the
House. This proposition was rejected unanimously, except for Virginia,
which was divided. The question was now postponed. Not until
August 9 was it finally settled, when election by the state legislature was
agreed to.88
There can be little doubt that this method of election was meant
to protect property rights. Madison and Wilson, it is true, opposed
choice by the legislatures because the latter were opposed to the trading
interests. Wilson was the only delegate to favor popular election.
Gerry next to Randolph, perhaps best expressed the sentiment of the
majority. According to him, the two principal interests were the landed
85 Ibid., I, 202, 214, 260 f.
88 Article I, Section 3, Clause 1.8T Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, I, 20 and 50.
8 Ibid., I, 152; II, 235.
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and the commercial. To draw both branches from the people would
give no protection to the second interest, since most people were
farmers and imagined that their interests were different from those of
the commercial group. 9
The Randolph resolutions made no mention of Senate continuity
and indicated only that the term should be long enough to guarantee
independence. On June 12, Spaight moved a seven-year term. Sherman
wanted five years; Pierce, three. Randolph supported Spaight, pointing
out that democratic licentiousness proved the need for a firm Senate.
The motion was adopted with but one dissenting vote.90
Some of the New England delegates, however, remained dis-
satisfied. On June 25, in the committee of the whole, a motion intro-
duced by Sherman and providing for striking out the seven-year term,
was adopted. The next day Gorham moved to fill the blank with six
years, one third to go out every second year.91 This brought on a new
discussion.
Madison made the principal speech this time. He observed that no
agrarian attempts had yet been made, but there had been "symptoms
of a leveling spirit." This was to be guarded against by creating a body
"sufficiently respectable for its wisdom and virtue." He therefore
proposed a nine-year term.92
Wilson agreed that a nine-year term was desirable, but for the
reason that the Senate would have the treaty-making power. A treaty
with England had been impossible because of the instability of the
government.9 3
Despite the arguments of Madison and Wilson the nine-year
proposal was rejected, with only three states voting for it. The
Gorham motion was then approved by seven affirmative votes. This
measure became permanent on August 9.94
The delay between approval by the committee of the whole and the
final vote of the Convention gave Gouverneur Morris a chance to
express himself. His idea of the Senate was one appointed by the
executive for life. It was to represent the rich as a check on the poor;
the plan was to be put through "by bribing the demagogues." 95
Outside of Wilson's idea of trade promotion through the treaty
power, the delegates associated the Senate with the protection of
property rights and a check on too much democracy. Hamilton and
Martin, in addition to those already referred to, gave eloquent testimony
89 Ibid., I, 152.
90 Ibid., I, 218.
91 Ibid., "408 and 421.
92 Ibid., I, 421 f.
93Ibid., I, 426.
94 Ibid.,- I, 426; II, 235.95 Ibid, 1, 511.
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as to this. According to Madison, it was the "Great Anchor of the
Government." Even Mason, more democratic than many, thought that
"one important object of constituting the Senate was to secure the
rights of property. '96
THE PRESIDENCY
In creating the executive department three main points were con-
sidered by the Convention: the question of a singular or plural
executive, the method of election, and the veto power.
The first of these questions caused little debate. The Randolph
resolutions did not indicate whether the executive was to be singular or
plural. Randolph himself favored the latter type. On June 1, however,
Wilson introduced a motion for a single executive, and, after a delay
of three days, it was carried with little opposition.97
The election of the President was one of the hardest problems of
the Convention. Under the original Virginia plan the executive was
to be elected by Congress, the term was left blank and there was to be
no eligibility for re-election. The last point was meant to give the
executive a certain degree of independence. 98
In June, in the committee of the whole, a motion of Charles
Pinckney for a seven-year term was carried by a five to four vote, with
Maryland divided, the question of the method of the election being
temporarily postponed. Wilson on this occasion favored a popular
election as the plan most likely to result in the choice of men of
notoriety and in the independence of the executive. The very next day
Wilson returned to the subject, proposing election by presidential
electors popularly chosen. He was voted down, with only two states
supporting him. Then the committee adopted a motion providing for
election by the national legislature. 99
This method did not altogether satisfy the Convention. When the
question came up again, almost two months later, it was referred to a
committee of eleven. September 4, this committee reported in favor of
a popularly chosen electoral college and for a four-year term. Accord-
ing to the committee report the Senate was to make the choice in case
no one received a majority of the electoral vote. Wilson opposed this
provision as tending to give the Senate so much power as to make it
overshadow the House. Consequently election by the House in case of
no majority was substituted on motion of Sherman, and the committee's
whole report was adopted with little opposition. 10
There is no direct evidence to show that this method of electing the
96 Ibid., I, 438.
97 Ibid., I, 64, 97.
98 Ibid., I, 20.
9Ibid., I, 68-69 and 80.
'o Ibid., II, 480, 497-98, 501, 522, 524-27.
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President was meant to protect property rights. In fact, at least some
of the delegates believed that the President should represent all of the
people. Gerry opposed popular election as likely to bring the chief
executive under the control of a particular group like the Cincinnati.
Gouverneur Morris favored popular election, since the President was
to be the protector of the people.' 0 '
One of the factors which guided the committee in its decision for
the electoral college system, was, according to Morris, "the indispens-
able necessity of making the executive independent of the legislature."'
102
To one who has traced the presidential election problem through its
various phases, this seems to have been the guiding principle through-
out. Even here protection of property rights was perhaps indirectly
aimed at, since insuring the independence of the President made his
veto power effective.
According to the Randolph resolutions the veto power was to be
exercised by the executive together with a number of the national
judiciary, and passage over the veto was to be by a simple majority
vote.
0 3
On June 4, a motion to make the veto absolute failed, despite the
support of Wilson and Hamilton. Then the principle of over-riding the
veto by a two-thirds vote was adopted. At the same time Gerry
introduced and secured the passage of a motion to eliminate the
judiciary from participation in the veto power. The reason for this,
as explained by Luther Martin, was that the judiciary would have the
power to declare laws unconstitutional and should not decide upon the
laws in two different capacities. 0 4
Two months later the majority necessary to over-rule a veto was
raised to three-fourths. In the end, though, the two-thirds requirement
was restored, to win popular favor and to prevent the concentration of
power in the hands of a few. Both Gouverneur Morris and Hamilton
held out for the larger majority on the ground that a two-thirds vote
had not been effective in checking popular legislation in New York.
Gerry, in taking a stand against the higher requirements, contended
that the primary purpose of the veto was to defend the power of the
executive department. 0 5
Madison combined the Morris-Hamilton and Gerry ideas. He said,
"The object of the revisionary power is twofold: 1. to defend the
executive right. 2. To prevent popular or factious injustice." It was
the latter that gave him chief concern. Earlier he had pointed out that
101 Ibid., I, 52 and 114.
102 Ibid., II, 499.
103 Ibid., II, 499.
104 Ibid., I, 76, 98, 103.
105 Ibid., II, 299 and 585.
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the state legislatures showed a tendency to pass pernicious laws; the
veto power was to check any similar tendency in the national legis-
lature.10 6 This obviously meant that the presidential negative was
intended largely to protect property rights.
THE LEGISLATIVE NEGATIVE
One of Madison's pet ideas was a negative of the national legislature
on the state legislatures. Almost two months before the Convention
met he wrote Randolph: "Let it (Congress) have a negative on the
legislative acts of the states, as the king of Great Britain heretofore had.
This I conceive to be essential and the least possible abridgement of
the state sovereignties."' 10 7
A modification of this letter was incorporated in the Virginia plan.
Congress was to have the power to "negative all laws passed by the
several states contravening in the opinion of the national Legislature
the articles of the union." This resolution made in the form of a motion
by Franklin, was agreed to in committee of the whole, May 31, without
debate or dissent. A week later Charles Pinckney moved that Congress
should be given the power "to negative all laws which they should judge
improper," thus reverting to the original Madison idea. In defense of
his measure Pinckney pointed out that state legislatures had often
violated acts of Congress and foreign treaties as well. Madison, coming
to Pinckney's aid, also mentioned treaty violations. The motion was
voted down by a large majority. 0 8 But the stand taken by its two
advocates shows that it was meant to promote commerce as well as to
check anti-creditor legislation.
The original Randolph resolution came up for consideration on
July 17 and was rejected because most of the delegates thought the
same purpose could be better carried out by the courts. Sherman seems
to have thought that the legislative negative would have prevented
judicial review of acts of the state legislatures.10 9 The idea, in fact, is
mainly important as affording one proof that the constitutional fathers
intended a judicial veto of state legislation.
JuDICIAL REVIEW
It was on this very occasion that Luther Martin moved his famous
"supreme law of the land" clause, to the effect that all acts of Congress
made in pursuance of the Constitution and all treaties made under the
authority of the United States should be the supreme law of the re-
spective states and enforceable in the state courts anything in their own
106 Ibid., II, 110 and 586.
107 0. G. Libby, Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States on
the Federal Constitution (Madison, 1894), 51.
108 Records of the Federal Convention, I, 22, 54, 164.
109 Ibid., I, 27.
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state constitutions to the contrary notwithstanding. This clause, slightly
modified later in the Convention, because of second strong proof of the
right of judicial review of state laws. Martin's intention, it is true, as
he later explained, was to limit the national government by reserving
original jurisdiction over federal cases to the state courts.11 0 Still the
principle of the thing was the same.
The other clause on which the right of judicial review is based in
the finished Constitution, is to be found in the section defining the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. The most significant part of the
clause reads: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States
and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority."
111
There is still a great deal of disagreement among historians and
writers on constitutional law as to the precise meaning of this passage.
Many authorities, while accepting the doctrine of judicial review, deny
that there is any definite provision in the Constitution supporting it.
Nevertheless, the author believes that any one who takes the trouble to
trace in detail the origin of the clause just quoted, will become convinced
that it was intended to confer the power of review on the courts.
The Randolph resolutions stated that the jurisdiction of the national
courts should extend to certain enumerated cases'and "to all cases in-
volving the national peace and harmony." A motion to this effect was
agreed to in the committee of the whole, on June 13. Five days later
the provision was amended, without dissent, to read that the jurisdiction
of the national courts should extend "to all laws arising under the
national constitution and to such other questions as may involve the
national peace and harmony. 1 1 2
Toward the end of August, Dr. Samuel Johnson of Connecticut
moved an amendment to make the national jurisdiction extend "to all
cases arising under this Constitution and the national laws." This was
agreed to by the unanimous vote of all the states, though Madison
personally opposed it as giving the courts control in political matters as
well as in purely judicial. 13
Thus the right of judicial review was built up step by step. The
original provision gave the federal courts supervision over the states.
The Johnson amendment extended this supervision to Congress, with-
out giving up judicial control over the states, since the Constitution in
the meantime had been made the supreme law of the land.
An attempt was made in the Committee of Detail to give the federal
judiciary an explicit negative on state laws. One of the early drafts in
110 Ibid., II, 27; III, 287.
"'Article III, Section 2.
112 Records of the Federal Convention, I, 22, 232; II, 46.
113 Ibid., II, 430.
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the hand writing of Randolph stated that "all laws of a particular state,
repugnant hereto, shall be void, and in the decision thereon, which shall
be vested in the supreme judiciary, all incidents without which the
general principles cannot be satisfied shall be considered as involved in
the general principle.""'
Not only the proceedings of the Convention prove that judicial
review was intended by the fathers. The opinion of the signers of the
Constitution, and of those who refused to sign, proves this and more.
It shows that judicial review was largely meant to protect property
rights. Only a few statements can be cited here.
According to Madison all the members of the Convention felt
throughout its proceedings "the necessity of some constitutional and
effective provision guarding the Constitution and the laws of the Union
against violations of them by the laws of the States." Madison was not
here referring explicitly to judicial review; he included the legislative
negative as well. In view of the fact, however, that judicial review was
finally preferred to the legislative negative, his statement is a fairly
strong argument in favor of the former practice. Only Mercer and
Dickinson definitely opposed judicial review in the Convention; and
they were referring to acts of Congress rather than to state legislation.""
More direct statements are not wanting. William R. Davie of North
Carolina believed that "without a general controlling judiciary laws
might be passed in particular states to enable its citizens to defraud'the
citizens of other states.""16
Luther Martin as attorney for the defense in the Chase impeach-
ment case, in 1804, declared that the framers of the Constitution feared
that the laws of the United States "might be very obnoxious to, and
unpopular in, some of the states . . . To obviate this the Constitution
has a provision for an appeal to the Supreme Court even from the
verdict of a jury."
If judicial supremacy had for its primary purpose the protection of
property rights, it was also designed to promote commerce. Statements
like those of Davie and Martin can be interpreted in both ways. It has
already been noted that Pinckney and Madison favored the legislative
negative to protect national treaties from legislative attacks of the
states. The inclusion, by the Committee of Detail, of treaties within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts had the same end in view." 7
GUARANTEES AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
There are two guarantees against domestic violence in the Constitu-
tion. The first of these is meant as a protection for the federal govern-
14 Ibid., II, 144.
"Is Ibid., II, 298; III, 527.
116 Ibid., III, 115.
117 Farrand, 155.
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.ment. It gives Congress the authority "To provide for calling for the
militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and
repel invasions.1"
The Virginia plan provided for calling forth the militia against any
member of the Union failing to fulfill its duties. According to the New
Jersey Plan, force could be used against individuals as well as against
states. The idea of using compulsion against states was finally dropped,
and the clause was put into its present form by the Committee of Detail
and agreed to, with no opposition, on August 23.19
The obvious purpose of this clause was to avoid such violation of
federal laws as had occurred under the Articles. No direct evidence
indicates that its purpose was the securing of property rights.
The second safe-guard against violence is much more the important
of the two. The United States guarantees to each state a republican
form of government and agrees to afford to each protection against
domestic violence on the application of the legislature, or of the execu-
tive if the legislature cannot be convened.120
The first motion on this subject, based upon the Randolph resolu-
tions, read "that a republican Constitution and its existing laws ought to
be guaranteed to each state by the United States." It met no opposition
in the committee of the whole. When it came up for consideration in
the Convention, Gouverneur Morris said that he was unwilling to
guarantee Rhode Island's laws; but was assured by Wilson that "The
object is merely to secure the States against dangerous commotions,
insurrections and rebellions."' 2'
To meet Morris's objection the clause was amended so as to have
the United States guarantee a republican form of government. The
Committee of Detail added the idea that federal aid was to be given
against domestic violence only on the application of the legislature.
Pinckney, Dickinson and Dayton opposed this change. Dayton thought
that the conduct of Rhode Island showed the necessity of suppressing
domestic violence even against the state legislature. An effort to strike
out the provision making an application of the legislature necessary was
rejected. To appease the delegates most anxious for federal protection
a clause was added giving the state executive the power to call for
federal aid when the legislature was not in session. 2 2
Most of the delegates seemed to be strongly in favor of this measure.
Oddly enough the New England members were less interested than
some of the others. Gerry was opposed altogether. He said that Shays'
I's Article I, Section 8.
119 Records of the Federal Convention, I, 20, 245; 11, 182, 230.
120 Article IV, Section 4.
121 Records of the Federal Convention, 1, 22; II, 47.
122 Ibid., II, 48-9, 168, 466.
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Rebellion would have resulted in more bloodshed if the federal govern-
ment had intermeddled.'2
3
THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST THE STATES
To protect private property against state legislative aggressions, the
Constitution says that no state is to coin money; emit bills of credit;
make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debt;
or pass "any law impairing the obligation of contracts.' 24
Randolph in excusing the makers of the Articles for not doing a
better job said that "the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen."
But strange to say his own plan contained no prohibition against the
emission of paper money or the violation of contracts. The first pro-
hibition was introduced by Randolph himself in the Committee of
Detail. This committee, on August 6, reported a clause that "No state
without the consent of the United States shall emit bills of credit, or
make anything but specie a tender in the payment of debt.'
'1 25
The Committee's report was considered on August 28. Wilson and
Sherman moved to make the prohibition absolute. Their motion was
carried, despite the fact Gorham was afraid it would antagonize the
people. Sherman argued that is was a favorable moment for crushing
paper money.2 6
The same day King moved to add a prohibition against state inter-
ference in private contracts. Gouverneur Morris believed that this was
going too far-that the courts were sufficient protection. Mason argued
that interference with contracts was sometimes necessary. Though
Sherman, Wilson, Madison and other important delegates favored this
clause, it was not voted on at this time. But the report of the Style
Committee, made on September 12, contained all of the prohibitions
found in the present Constitution. The report was adopted two days
later.2 7
It is interesting to note that Gerry on the latter occasion introduced
a motion to prohibit Congress from impairing contracts. His motion
was not even seconded.2 8
Madison gave what seems to be the best interpretation to the
restraints on the states when he said: "The evil which produced the
prohibitory clause in the Constitution of the United States was the
practice of the states in making bills of credit, and in some instances
appraised property, a legal tender.' 29 Yet in presenting Governor
123 Ibid., II, 316.
124 Article I, Section 10.
125 Records of the Federal Convention, I, 18; II, 144.
1261 bid., II, 439.
27 Ibid., II,. 439, 596, 619.
128 Ibid., II, 619.
129 Ibid., III, 493.
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Huntington with a copy of the Constitution, Sherman and Ellsworth
said that this clause "was thought necessary as a security to com-
merce."1 30 They made no reference to property rights.
CONCLUSION
No attempt has been made to minimize the importance of property
rights in the Convention. The author believes that the machinery of
government was largely fashioned for this purpose. But if this point
could be proved with even a greater degree of certainty, he would
still hold that commerce was the guiding star of the Convention, for
the following reasons:
First, the Convention grew out of commercial difficulties. Second,
the members were more unanimously agreed, in the beginning at least,
as to the need for commercial regulation. Third, the great debates and
compromises of the Convention concerned commerce. Lastly, and most
important, it was in the field of commerce after all that the national
government was made sovereign. More important than mere govern-
mental machinery or restraints is sovereign power. The granting of
sovereign power in foreign and interstate commerce showed where the
real interests of the constitutional fathers lay.
18' Pa. Packet, Nov. 10, 1787.
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